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ABSTRACT
A common approach when setting up a website is to utilize
third party Web hosting and content delivery networks. With-
out taking this trend into account, any measurement study
inspecting the deployment and operation of websites can be
heavily skewed. Unfortunately, the research community lacks
generalizable tools that can be used to identify how and
where a given website is hosted. Instead, a number of ad hoc
techniques have emerged, e.g., using Autonomous System
databases, domain prefixes for CNAME records. In this work
we propose Pythia, a novel lightweight approach for iden-
tifying Web content hosted on third-party infrastructures,
including both traditional Web hosts and content delivery
networks. Our framework identifies the organization to which
a given Web page belongs, and it detects which Web servers
are self-hosted and which ones leverage third-party services
to provide contents. To test our framework we run it on
40,000 URLs and evaluate its accuracy, both by comparing
the results with similar services and with a manually vali-
dated groundtruth. Our tool achieves an accuracy of 90% and
detects that under 11% of popular domains are self-hosted.
We publicly release our tool to allow other researchers to
reproduce our findings, and to apply it to their own studies.
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1 INTRODUCTION
When deploying a website, companies have the choice to
either host it on their own servers, or to offload the content
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to third-parties, e.g., Web hosts or Content Delivery Networks
(CDNs). Choosing a third party can have multiple advantages,
including cost savings, reliability, and the ability to sustain
larger amounts of traffic (even during distributed denial
of service attacks). We argue that understanding the Web
hosting landscape is important for a number of reasons. These
range from allowing us to assess how critical certain hosting
infrastructures are and to estimate the impact that a network
attack could have on the Web [8, 17, 24], to being able to
determine who is responsible when incidents (e.g., malware
hosting) occur [26]. Despite the importance of the problem,
the research community lacks scalable methods to map the
hosting landscape. Instead, multiple studies tend to take an
ad hoc approach, relying on various assumptions, which differ
between papers. Although there are third party services that
offer this functionality [18, 30], they do not disclose their
methodology, creating concerns for both reproducibility, as
well as accuracy of their results.
To fill this gap, this paper presents an open source tool to
the community,1 which can determine whether the webpage of
an organization is self-hosted or it uses a third-party hosting
provider. Our tool, Pythia, leverages the HTML code of the
webpage, domain information, and the network ownership
obtained from RDAP records, to determine if the content
is hosted on a third-party infrastructure. This is done by
computing the ownership of both the webpage and the hosting
provider, such that the two can be compared. Pythia is
built with a modular design and it is capable of obtaining
information of the landing webpage even in the presence of
complex HTML structures which use redirects.
To evaluate the efficacy of Pythia, we run it on 40,000
URLs generated from the Alexa top-10k domains [2]. Our
validation process shows that our framework outperforms
similar applications available on the Web, and it achieves an
accuracy of 90% in detecting when a webpage is hosted by
a third party. Furthermore, our measurement reports that
over 89% of the popular domains that we inspected, take
advantage of third parties for their hosting needs.
Pythia is open source and allows the research community
to reproduce our findings. We intend this to become a shared
community effort, allowing third party researchers to avoid
the complexity involved in devising and building their own
independent methodologies for this commonly encountered
task.
1The source code of Pythia is available at https://bitbucket.org/
srdjanmatic/pythia.git
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2 BACKGROUND
Understanding and measuring the Web hosting ecosystem
is a complex endeavor. To complete this task, we need both
information about the ownership of domains and the owner-
ship of the IP addresses where webpages are hosted. In this
section we introduce the concepts on which our approach is
based, and the type of data that we retrieve to determine
whether webpages are self-hosted or not.
2.1 Third-Party Hosting
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and Hosting Services
are two popular mechanisms for delivering content to end
users on behalf of other organizations. By offloading the
task of serving the content of a website to third parties,
these solutions are designed to provide better availability,
scalability, faster content loads, redundancy, and enhanced
security. These technologies have become so widespread that
according to recent statistics, more than 60% of the most
visited websites use CDNs to serve content to their users [4].
In this work we study the deployment of any kind of solution
that delivers Web content for third parties, and for this reason
we use the term hosting to refer to the network where Web
servers offering a service are based.
There are countless papers that have explored the hosting
patterns of websites, each taking a slightly different approach.
A common approach is to launch large-scale distributed mea-
surements [1, 9, 25], which perform DNS queries around the
world to retrieve and classify DNS responses. This, unfor-
tunately, is extremely complex and costly; furthermore, it
cannot alone confirm if the infrastructure is third-party op-
erated without further inspection. Calder et al. [6] utilized
the EDNS-0 Client Subnet extension to simulate distributed
queries towards Google’s CDN. Although it revealed a large
number of servers, all were operated by Google rather than
third-parties. These techniques also do not work well for Any-
cast CDNs [7], which do not necessarily return DNS responses
containing redirects. Another strategy employed is to utilize
domain prefix lists, which map CNAME responses to their
respective CDNs [21]. These, however, are limited to CDNs
that exclusively rely on CNAME redirects (e.g., this excludes
Bing). Furthermore, the list requires constant maintenance
to remain up-to-date. Lastly, some studies utilize IP address
to Autonomous System (AS) mappings [14] or metadata en-
coded into DNS records [3]; these, however are vulnerable to
misattributing ownership, e.g, when a CDN places a cache
in a third-party network. Such techniques have also been
complimented with manually curated AS annotations, which
stipulate the type of AS [19]. Again, these suffer from both
manual annotation errors and require substantial upkeep. We
argue that these diverse ad hoc techniques are driven by the
lack of a standardized tool within the community, which can
provide metadata on website hosting patterns.
2.2 The RDAP Protocol
To acquire information about a domain’s ownership we use
the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) [22]. This
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Figure 1: An overview of Pythia. The task man-
ager processes URLs from a queue and instantiates
a crawler task for each URL. The crawler collects
information about a webpage and the environment
from which the page was retrieved. The output of
the crawler is stored in a dedicated data structure,
which is later analyzed with the module that checks
if content was served from a self-hosted network en-
vironment.
protocol was designed to replace the WHOIS [16] protocol
as the authoritative source for registering information about
IP addresses, ASes and domain names. While its predecessor
retrieved free text content, RDAP leverages a RESTful inter-
face to deliver the data in a machine-readable JSON format.
This simplifies the parsing process and allows us to easily
extract information (e.g., the type of entity to which a range
of IP addresses has been assigned, or the description of an
AS). In this paper, we use the RDAP protocol to retrieve
information about the ownership of an IP address to which
a domain resolved.
3 OVERVIEW OF PYTHIA
Pythia is entirely written in Python, and Figure 1 provides
an overview of its system components. In a pipeline, Pythia
performs the following two steps, (i) Data Collection: it
takes a URL feed, and renders the list of websites, recording
detailed information on all resources loaded, before comple-
menting the data with RDAP records for the IP address
hosting the website; and (ii) Hosting Detector: it then passes
this information through a hosting detector, which decides
if the owner of the webpage is the same as the owner of
the hosting infrastructure where the server is located. The
outcome is a structured JSON file that details if the website
is self-hosted or operated by a third-party. In addition to
this, Pythia also provides information on the ownership of
both the webpage and the hosting service.
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3.1 Data Collection
We first present the methods we use to collect the necessary
data to infer ownership. This includes Web data, DNS infor-
mation and, finally, RDAP records for all domains loaded.
Web Data Collection. Upon receiving a list of URLs, the
crawler obtains Web content through Selenium,2 a popular
framework used for testing Web applications. We instrument
Selenium to take a URL and to render it within a fully
fledged instance of the Google Chrome browser. After the
page has been loaded and rendered, our module outputs
the retrieved HTML, in addition to a list of all the HTTP
requests/responses (URLs) that were generated during the
process. Each request/response is accompanied by metadata
including the HTTP status code, and HTTP headers (e.g.,
server, content-type).
An important part of the crawling process is to determine
when a webpage has finished loading. Since we do not know
how long this process will take, we use an adaptive mechanism
that leverages the information logged by the Web browser.
We continuously monitor the browser logs and we consider the
page loaded once all the requests to external resources have
received their corresponding response. At the same time, we
also set a hard timeout, after which we will close the browser
session independently if the loading succeeded or not.
As part of the process, we also follow all the redirects
that occur while loading an URL. This includes not just
CNAME or HTTP redirects, but also those triggered by
the refresh meta tag or a script. However, being primarily a
tool for developers who need to check their own webpages,
Selenium does not provide access to the browser internals.
Hence, Pythia extracts information about the redirection
chain from the browser log. After filtering out all the request
to external resources, we identify the landing page and URLs
on which the browser terminated the navigation.
Domain Resolution. Since Web browser logs do not contain
information about domain resolution, Pythia launches DNS
queries for all domains encountered (at a modest cost of
only around 3.2% additional overhead per webpage). An
advantage of this systems is that we can to use our own DNS
server and we do not need to rely on the built-in mechanisms
of proprietary resolvers, which might be hardcoded in the
browser.
IP Ownership. Using the DNS results, we then determine
the “owner” of the IP space where the content is hosted.
Pythia uses the RDAP protocol to find the network prefix
to which an IP address belongs to, and to identify the owner
of that range. Our framework uses a local RDAP cache to
overcome rate-limiting issues of RDAP servers and to avoid
querying ranges for which we already have fresh information.
After successfully completing the RDAP resolutions, all the
data generated by the above steps is stored in a JSON data
structure.
2https://www.seleniumhq.org/
3.2 Detecting Hosting Infrastructures
The next step is to use the above information to detect if
a website is self-hosted, or whether it uses on a third-party
infrastructure. Our tool identifies the organization/company
behind a domain name and a webpage, and searches for
evidence that the page owner is the same as the owner of
the network prefix or the AS hosting the Web server. We do
not differentiate among various types of hosting services (i.e.,
VPS, CDN, or generic web hosting) and we do not use any
precompiled list of popular or known hosting services. Instead
we extract our information from the URL and the HTML
retrieved from the landing page, and we match this data
with the RDAP response of the IP address that is hosting
the web server. This process allows us to detect the third-
party network infrastructures even in the presence of CDN
caches located at ISPs: even if we did not identify correctly
the provider, our algorithm will detect a mismatch in the
ownership of the webpage and the IP range.
To identify the organization that owns a webpage we use
both the information from the URL and the HTML code.
In particular, from the URL component we extract the Ef-
fective Second Level Domain (ESLD), and from the HTML
we use the content of the <title> tag. Before retrieving any
ownership information for a RDAP response, we first filter
unnecessary details from the data such as “comments” or
the “symbolic name of the network”, which can contain ref-
erences to the owner of the webpage even when the IP range
is assigned to a completely different organization. After this
step, each string contained in the HTML title or the RDAP
fields has its leading space delimiters removed, is cleaned
from punctuation characters and stop words, converted into
lower case, and finally is split into tokens on space delimiters.
The DNS system does not allow domain names to contain
space delimiters and it is common have domains, such as
“bankofamerica.com”, where the ESLD is a combination of
multiple words. To overcome this issue, the ESLD string
follows the same cleaning process of the title and the RDAP,
with the only difference in the tokenization, which is per-
formed following the technique described in [23].
This process results in a series of string tokens that rep-
resent ownership features of both the webpage and the
domain/IP address hosting it. The next step is to com-
pare these tokens to see if they correspond. Our algorithm
does six checks: four with the strings contained in the ti-
tle/ESLD/RDAP, and an additional two with the tokenized
versions of those strings. First, the algorithm verifies if the
HTML title or the ESLD appears as a sub-string in any of
the RDAP fields. Subsequently it repeats the same procedure
with each string in the RDAP fields by comparing it both
with the HTML title and the ESLD. The output of this pro-
cess is binary and if the algorithm finds a match, it concludes
that the owner of the webpage is also the owner of the net-
work. As a final step, the algorithm checks for the presence
of common tokens among the lists of tokens obtained from
the HTML title/ESLD and the RDAP information. In this
case a single match is not enough to conclude that the same
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organization owns both the webpage and the network, and
we require that the common tokens represent at least 50% of
the overall number of tokens in the shortest list.
4 VALIDATION AND EVALUATION
Pythia is intended to be both accurate and straightforward
to use for the community. To validate its capabilities we next
run it over multiple datasets.
4.1 Validating the Data Collection
Our first goal is to test the efficacy of our crawler in collect-
ing the necessary data to perform the hosting classification.
Hence, we run Pythia over a series of URL lists. A first
dataset includes 10,000 unique domain names obtained from
a snapshot of the “Alexa top 10,000 websites” (top-10k)
on 1st of May 2018. A second dataset (top-20k-www) is
an extended version of the previous one, where domains are
extended with the “www.” prefix. Finally, a third dataset
(top-40k-URLs) includes all the entries from top-20k-www
expanded with “http://” and “https://” prefixes.
Data Collection. We run Pythia over the top-40k-URLs
to collect information about their home pages. We split our
dataset into chunks of 350 elements and we process each chunk
separately. Each element of the chunk is a unique domain
name, which is crawled both with and without the “www.”
prefix and with the two protocols that Pythia supports
(HTTP and HTTPS). This means that when we successfully
crawl an entire chunk, we obtain information for 1400 unique
URLs. We refer to the initial URL from which we begin our
crawling, and that we load in the browser, as “starting URL”;
similarly, the URL on which the crawl terminates is called
“landing URL”. Once a chunk is processed, Pythia waits for
120 seconds before switching to the next one. Each chunk is
analyzed using 20 parallel instances of our Crawler module,
which uses a maximum timeout of 60 seconds while waiting
for a webpage to finish loading. Note that when collecting IP
Ownership information from RDAP, we randomize waiting
timeouts, with of a maximum of 90 seconds, before retry-
ing a query that triggered an exception; after 3 consecutive
exceptions, the module marks an IP as “no info available”
before switching to the next one. The entire data collection
process took place from a single machine, although we note
it is possible to split the dataset and run parallel instances
of Pythia on different machines.
Data Collection Performance. The overall process of down-
loading the HTML, resolving DNS names and collecting
RDAP data, took 35 hours to complete for the top-40k-
URLs. Figure 2 presents the Cumulative Distribution Func-
tion (CDF) of the increase of number successful crawls across
time. To be able to use fresh entries from our local RDAP
cache, we crawled the 4 starting URLs linked to each domain
at the same time. Due to this choice, the CDFs of each “URL
format” have very similar shapes. Hence four distributions
in Figure 2 are almost stacked on the top of each other,
and the red line connecting the values is the average across
Figure 2: Cumulative distribution functions of the
successful crawls with different URL formats.
those distributions. After 24 hours, we had crawled only 50%
of the URLs, and in the last 1/3 of the time, we obtained
the information for the remaining half of the dataset. The
dataset contained shuffled entries, which did not follow any
ranking depending on the “popularity of a domain” and the
likelihood to have an “unreachable URL” at the beginning or
at the end the crawl is the same. We explain the spike in the
increase of the number of downloads after the 24th hour with
the presence of our RDAP cache. As we will later show, the
majority of URLs/domains use a third-party hosting provider
and as times passes we observe an increase of the number of
RDAP queries which can be resolved with our local cache.
Those local resolutions increase our crawling speed allowing
us to allow us to gather information for the same amount of
elements, in half of the time.
In Table 1 we summarize the results of the data collection
process using Pythia. The first thing to notice is that 85%
of the starting URLs are successfully reached. Overall, our
crawler visited 1,736,929 external URLs, which were retrieved
from 54,410 different domains. This suggests an average factor
of 42 URLs per “starting URL”. It is therefore clear that
each HTML page contains a considerable number of external
resources, although it should be noted that this not only
includes links to script and images, but also redirects from a
starting to a landing webpage. Independently of the protocol
and the presence of the “www.” prefix, the 6th column in
the Table shows that redirects are extremely popular. On
average we pass via 2.4 intermediate URLs before reaching
a landing page. For this estimate we only use redirects that
happen when loading a “starting URL” in our browser, and
we excluded any redirects triggered by the external resources
embedded in the HTML of the landing webpage. In general,
redirects seem to be more popular for the HTTP protocol,
but the average difference with HTTPS is minimal.
Related to the redirect phenomenon, we also notice that
more than 60% of the crawls observed a “change of the
domain” name among the “starting URL” and the “landing
URL”. This happens with only 1/3 of that frequency value
if we crawl domains without the “www.” prefix. The reason
is that often the redirection happens from one domain to the
same domain expanded with the “www.” prefix. A similar
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URLs (Domains) IPs
All Starting Crawls Landing
Format Tot. Tot. Completed Domain
Change
Protocol
Change
AVG. Redi-
rects
NON-
triggering
exceptions
self-host 3rd-host Tot. NON-
triggering
exceptions
Landing
Domains
http 874,574
(46,679)
10,000
(10,000)
9,204 6,114 6,701 2.6 8,968
(8,897)
941 (935) 8,027
(7,962)
34,332 33,728 8,178
http +
www
885,035
(43,359)
10,000
(10,000)
9,280 2,606 6,627 2.4 9,033
(8,962)
977 (971) 8,056
(7,991)
32,496 31,973 8,214
https 745,939
(40,696)
10,000
(10,000)
8,215 5,147 580 2.3 8,037
(7,989)
877 (873) 7,160
(7,116)
30,640 30,217 7,353
https +
www
794,449
(39,787)
10,000
(10,000)
8,673 2,229 491 2.2 8,462
(8,404)
918 (913) 7,544
(7,491)
30,177 29,781 7,683
All 1,736,929
(54,410)
40,000
(20,000)
35,372 16,096 14,399 2.4 13,940
(11,253)
1,559
(1,220)
12,381
(10,033)
38,092 37,492 9,188
Table 1: Results of running Pythia on the top-40k-URLs dataset. The values in the brackets indicates the
unique number of elements for each entry.
trend is observable for the “change of the protocol”, when
crawling URLs with HTTP (which get upgraded to HTTPS).
The overall number of unique IPs of the landing pages is
slightly less than 10,000, and it reflects the fact that crawling
the same domain with the four different formats, most of the
time will lead to the same landing URL/domain. On average
there are 1.22 domain per each landing IP (comparison of
columns 7 and 12 in Table 1). This is explained by the pres-
ence of large hosting providers with many different customers.
The same argument explains why we observe a similar rela-
tionship of 1.43 domains per each IP, when considering the
dataset of all URLs. Finally, the results of Pythia indicate
that 89% of the landing URLs are served from a third-party
hosting infrastructure which does not belong to the owner of
the webpage. In the following section we illustrate how we
tested the accuracy of our classification, by using a manu-
ally validated groundtruth and by comparing with similar
applications.
4.2 Classification Validation
We next validate the efficacy of our tool by compiling a
groundtruth classification, and comparing it against Pythia.
Compiling a Comparative Dataset. To the best of our
knowledge, no groundtruth dataset exists regarding Web
hosting. To build this, we randomly select 324 domain names
to manually annotate. These are taken from the top-10k
dataset, crawled with the HTTP protocol. For each of these
domains, we load the landing webpage in a browser and use
search engines to check if the owner of the IP prefix is an
organization offering Web hosting or CDN services to its
customers.
We note that 324 domains are not enough to evaluate our
tool. Thus, we also collect equivalent data from a variety
of public tools that allow users to “discover who is hosting
a website”. This allows us to compare our results against
their outputs. Example of those services include Hosting-
Compass.com which can detect who is hosting an ESLD,
or HostingDetector.com and What’s My CDN? which
allow more fine grained queries including “www.” as prefix
to the ESLD [11, 12, 31]. We choose to use those three ap-
plication because they are free Web-based services that do
not require any registration. We query those services with
the URLs from our top-10k and top-20k-www datasets,
Self-hosting 3rd-party hosting
Tool/Service TP FN TP FN F1-score
Pythia 26 3 279 16 0.73
hostingcompass 27 2 102 193 0.21
hostingdetector 12 17 239 56 0.25
whatsmycdn 27 2 127 168 0.24
cdnfinder 28 1 65 230 0.2
Table 2: Performance comparison of Pythia and
other applications on our manually validated
groundtruth.
depending on the service. As the services mentioned above
do not provide any detail about the methodology they use
to detect hosting providers, in addition to those Web ap-
plications, we also use cdnfinder, an open-source project
which aims to detect the usage of CDNs within websites. The
tool uses phantomjs and a hard-coded list of hostnames to
load a webpage and detect the presence of external resources
which are hosted on a CDN [20, 28]. Analogously to the Web
services, we downloaded the tool and run it on our top-40k-
URLs dataset. In total, this results in 5 datasets to compare
Pythia against.
Comparison with Manual Annotations. Table 2 contains
the results of comparing Pythia against the above online ser-
vices, using the manual annotations as the groundtruth. Our
algorithm was specifically designed for detecting the presence
of “self-hosting” environments. Consequently, a domain will
be flagged as “hosted on third-parties” in any situation where
the webpage owner differs from the owner of the network
prefix (e.g., a private Web server run at at home, where the
broadband ISP is the owner of the network prefix). Despite
this limitation, in the binary classification problem where a
website is either self-hosted or hosted on a third-party service,
Pythia still outperforms all the other services that we tested,
achieving an F1-score which is almost three times larger than
the average for the other services. Indeed, on our manual
groundtruth we observe an accuracy of over 95%, even when,
instead of verifying self-hosting, we focus on the complemen-
tary problem of detecting the presence of third-party hosting
providers. cdnfinder performs well in detecting self hosting,
but has a very high false positive rate when classifying do-
mains as third-party hosting. Similarly, hostingdetector
achieves the highest accuracy in detecting external hosting
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service domain www. + domain http + domain https + domain http + www. + domain https + www. + domain
hostingcompass 3,481 (3,283) - - - - -
hostingdetector 3,229 (2,879) 5,607 (4,973) - - - -
whatsmycdn 978 (963) 3,268 (3,202) - - - -
cdnfinder - - 59 (55) 403 (395) 149 (144) 1,849 (1,700)
Table 3: Comparison of Pythia with similar services/applications when evaluated on all of our datasets. The
values in the brackets indicates results obtained by Pythia.
services, at a cost of an extremely high false negative rate
(59%), when a single organization is in control of both the
webpage and the network prefix.
Comparison with Similar Services. To further test the
accuracy of our framework, we compare our results with
the four tools/services mentioned earlier. The results of this
comparison are shown in Table 3. The goal of this is to show
that Pythia achieves similar results to other applications. To
this end, we narrow our goal to identify all domains which are
hosted on third-party network infrastructures. As mentioned
in the previous sections, Pythia follows any kind of redirect.
Hence, Table 1 only presents the classification using the
“landing URLs/domains”. Since we do not know what are the
exact capabilities of the four services that we tested, and
how they handle redirects, we decided to back-propagate
the results of our classification from the “landing URL” to
the corresponding “starting URL”, and “starting domain”,
from where the navigation started. In this way we are able
to compare our results with each one of those services and
verify that our framework has a detection rate close to those
of the other services.
For almost all of the domains inspected, Pythia achieves
an accuracy of around 90%, and it identifies a third-party-
hoster every time one of the other four services detects its
presence. Since the highest number of misclassified services
originate from the sets of domains analyzed with hostingde-
tector, we sampled 20 domains without the “www.” prefix
and another 20 with the “www.” prefix. We then manually
verify if they are actually hosted on a third-party infrastruc-
ture. For 27 out of 40 cases, hostingdetector failed to
identify self-hosted domains and Pythia correctly labeled
those as “self-hosting”. Ten of those cases were domains of
large universities with their own network prefixes. For an-
other 7 cases, the landing page is the home page of large
hosting services such as “Google”, “Salesforce” or “1and1”.
Pythia correctly labeled these as self-hosted. For four do-
mains our Pythia did not succeed in downloading the RDAP
information, and Pythia could not classify those domains.
The remaining 9 domains were hosted on a third-party in-
frastructure, but we did not detect them. According to those
results, we conclude that the accuracy of Pythia is inline
with similar services we compared to.
5 RELATED WORK
A significant amount of research has been done in the field
of Content Delivery Networks and cloud computing. Krish-
namurthy et al. [15] were the first to analyze the rise of
CDNs and the benefits that they provide to end-users. After
them several studies investigated this trend [1, 7, 13, 25].
Similar work has tried to uncover cloud usage patterns and
which Web services are running on a cloud-associated IP
address [10, 29].
Our techniques relies on a mix of methodologies, particu-
larly exploiting RDAP data. There have been a small set of
past papers that rely on similar data. For example, Cai et al.
proposed to combine WHOIS information with the ASN in
order to generate a comprehensive AS-to-organization map-
ping [5]. Tajalizadehkhoob et al. were the first ones to explore
the identification of hosting provides by combining passive
DNS with WHOIS information [27]. Unfortunately their ap-
proach leverages a classification of 2,000 ASes to filter out
organization such as ISPs, education and government. This
list has limited size and is manually generated, and this raises
concerns about its reliability across time. Contrary to previ-
ous studies, our work does not use any precomplied list of
organization names and it focuses on identifying self-hosting
environments. Pythia allows other researchers to reproduce
our results and it does not require any manual analysis or a
priori knowledge of network prefixes or the ASes in charge
for routing the network traffic.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work we presented Pythia, a tool for collecting in-
formation about a webpage and the environment where the
page is hosted. Our framework extracts information from the
retrieved HTML, the DNS and the ownership information
associated to a network prefix. Pythia then exploits this
data to infer if the website is self-hosted, or is reliant on a
third party operator, e.g., a Content Delivery Network. We
tested Pythia on 40,000 URLs and compared the results with
similar applications that detect the presence of known host-
ing providers. Our framework is accurate and outperforms
all other applications, when tested on a manually validated
groundtruth. Pythia is released as open source and is built
in a modular way, which gives the possibility to integrate it
with new capabilities and extensions.
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